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LOYALTY IN GOVERNMENT LITIGATION: DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE REPRESENTATION OF AGENCY CLIENTS*
Whom does the Department of Justice (DOJ or Department)
represent when it appears in court? As with many simple ques-
tions, the answer is surprisingly evasive. DOJ conducts the bulk
of litigation in the name of the federal government,' but the
interests of the federal government often are hard to define.
Because the vast bureaucracy reaches in all directions, it has
diverse views on litigation policy. The problems of integrating
policy through litigation surface when DOJ becomes involved in
representing agencies in litigation. Consider the situation that
tests the question of whom DOJ represents:2 What is DOJ to do
when an agency asks it to litigate a matter that the Department
does not consider to be in the best interests of the government?3
* The Author wishes to thank Professor Neal Devins for his scholarship and
guidance on this topic.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1988) provides the general authority for litigation by DOJ. It
states: "Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in which the
United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and securing
evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the
direction of the Attorney General." Id.
2. The problem may arise in a variety of circumstances, such as when agency
policy conflicts with DOJ's interpretation of executive policy, when resources prohibit
pursuing all agency litigation, or when DOJ believes agency policy is contrary to the
public's best interest. The problem is best discussed when questions of ethical wrong-
doing or confidentiality are not at issue. This Note assumes that all lawyers have a
duty to the court to report fraud and corruption regardless of the attorney-client
relationship. The unresolved problem arises when ethical responsibilities are in
question because multiple institutions are competing for an attorney's loyalty.
3. This Note uses the term "agency" as defined by the Federal Bar Association:
(1) An Executive agency, including an Executive department, military
department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation,
and an independent establishment; (2) The Congress, committees of Con-
gress, members of Congress who employ lawyers, and Congressional agen-
cids; (3) The courts of the United States and agencies of the Judiciary;
(4) The Governments of the territories and possessions of the United,
States; or (5) The Government of the District of Columbia.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR FEDERAL LAWYERS, Definitions (Fed.
B. Ass'n 1990), reprinted in SELECTED STATUTES, RULES AND STANDARDS ON THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 566 (John S. Dzienkowski ed., 1993) [hereinafter SELECTED STAT-
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The problem raises three basic issues: first, who is the "client"
and whose interest does the Department represent; second, is
this different from the normally established bureaucratic hierar-
chy; and third, is it appropriate for DOJ to dictate the types of
issues that it will litigate for agencies? The answers to these
questions help to determine who is responsible for implementing
executive policy in the courts.
Commentators wrestle over the potential question of whom
DOJ represents. Possibilities include: (1) the public interest, (2)
the government as a whole, (3) the agency official, (4) the agency
itself, (5) the President, (6) the Attorney General, and (7) the
Department of Justice.4 No overarching standard, law, or guide-
line clearly defines DOJ's duties and loyalties. Each choice ap-
pears exclusive and in conflict with the other possibilities. As a
result, theorists and practitioners artfully articulate models that
explain and defend each one of these options.5 This Note will
clarify and evaluate the rationales for these different models.
Evaluating models for Department representation requires the
consideration of several factors. First, consider the potential role
of DOJ regarding any issue. DOJ's legal representation duties
may include rendering prelitigation opinions, reviewing pending
legislation and regulations, resolving interagency disputes, liti-
gating agency matters, and arguing before any court, including
the Supreme Court.6 Each role requires the DOJ lawyer to have
UTES].
4. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, The Lawyer As Whistleblower: Confidentiality and
the Government Lawyer, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 291, 296 (1991) (finding the attor-
ney-client relationship for a DOJ lawyer to be more complicated than the rela-
tionship between a corporation and its in-house counsel); Catherine J. Lanctot, The
Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal Government Lawyer: The
Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 951, 967 (1991) (concluding that differ-
ent ethical standards apply to government lawyers than to other lawyers); Ronald I.
Keller, Note, The Applicability and Scope of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Exec-
utive Branch of the Federal Government, 62 B.U. L. REv. 1003, 1010-11 (1982) (iden-
tifying the relevant agency as the client to whom the attorney-client privilege ap-
plies).
5. In support of the agency model, see infra notes 232-56 and accompanying text.
In support of the public interest model, see infra notes 187-231 and accompanying
text. In support of the unified executive model, see infra notes 257-97 and accompa-
nying text. In support of the DOJ-as-its-own-client model, see infra notes 124-52 and
accompanying text.
6. For a discussion of the Department's duties, see Robert P. Lawry, Who Is the
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different loyalties and perform different duties. Although differ-
ent lawyers at DOJ handle these various roles, the question
remains as to what the Department's overall relationship with
the agencies should be.
A model's ability to recognize the policy implications that are
part of government litigation is a second important factor in the
evaluation because any decision that the government makes
about taking part in litigation and settlements makes a state-
ment about its policy. "The fact is that ingredients of law and
policy inescapably permeate the conduct of the government's
litigation, both in setting general litigation policies and in mak-
ing decisions in individual cases."' Decisions about litigation
may reflect the importance that the government places on an
issue. The question remains: who should have the responsibility
for making that policy decision?
A third factor concentrates on ethical standards. These stan-
dards guide the individual attorney and potentially DOJ. Ethi-
cal responsibilities may not adequately guide an attorney when
multiple institutions compete for attorney loyalty. The ethical
standards define the duty of the individual lawyer, but whether
they also apply to an institution is unclear. The ethical duty
that the individual lawyer owes an institution may not coincide
with the loyalty owed by DOJ.
Fourth, models of representation often are affected by consid-
erations of bureaucratic power? If DOJ has a role in shaping
the litigation of agency matters, then it can exert considerable
Client of the Federal Government Lawyer? An Analysis of the Wrong Question, FED.
B.J., Fall 1978, at 61. For an evaluation of DOJ's opinion-making function according
to its role, see John 0. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney
General: A Normative, Descriptive, and Historical Prolegomenon, 15 CARDOzO L. REV.
375 (1993).
7. DANIEL J. MEADOR, THE PRESIDENT, THE ATrORNEY GENERAL, AND THE DE-
PARTMENT OF JUSTICE 33 (1980).
8. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPoNsIImrrY EC 7-14 (1983); MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (1995).
9. See generally, Douglas W. Kmiec, OLC's Opinion Writing Function: The Legal
Adhesive for a Unitary Executive, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 337 (1993) (describing DOJ as
the glue holding together conflicting agency agendas); Nelson Lund, Rational Choice
at the Office of Legal Counsel, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 437 (1993) (viewing DOJ as
being closely aligned with the president in agency disputes); McGinnis, supra note 6,
at 425-29 (noting that DOJ's power to issue legal opinions checks agency autonomy).
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control over the agency by limiting its enforcement capability.
The power of wielding litigation authority can be a great tool for
a president with little control over much of the administrative
state." This power friction becomes even more evident when
Congress asserts its power to control agencies by removing liti-
gating authority from DOJ and giving it to the agency." Decen-
tralized litigation authority simplifies loyalty issues but can
cause inconsistent government action in the courts. 2
Finally, historical uses of the roles and functions of DOJ often
help to define its loyalties." On the one hand, the tradition of
having strong figures serve as Attorney General gives instruc-
tive guidance to many when determining DOJ's role in agency
representation. On the other hand, history is replete with con-
gressional action to decentralize litigation authority and limit
DOJ's political influence.
This Note will clarify the problems of loyalty for the Depart-
ment of Justice in agency representation. The first section pro-
vides the context for the discussion on loyalty by examining the
current state of DOJ litigation authority. 4 The second section
examines behavioral models of DOJ loyalty, including a histori-
cal perspective model and a bureaucratic model. 5 Some com-
mentators look to experience and political maneuvering to ex-
plain DOJ loyalties, whereas others use normative models in an
attempt to distance DOJ from arbitrary and partisan loyalties.
The third section discusses the effect of using the ethical respon-
sibilities of a government attorney as a normative model for
10. For example, in FTC v. Guignon, 390 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1968), DOJ success-
fully argued that the FTC lacked statutory authority to enforce judicially its own
subpoenas or even appear in court. The Solicitor General then refused to file a cer-
tiorari petition, which cemented DOJ's litigating authority in this area. See also
John F. Davis, Department of Justice Control of Agency Litigation 1-17 (Aug. 14,
1975) (unpublished report prepared for the Administrative Conference of the United
States) (on file with Author) (outlining the legal relationships between DOJ and
agencies).
11. See generally Susan M. Olson, Challenges to the Gatekeeper: The Debate over
Federal Litigating Authority, 68 JUDIcATURE 71 (1984) (describing the debate over
how to distribute governmental litigating authority between DOJ and agencies).
12. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 43-123 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 18-42 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 43-152 and accompanying text.
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defining the loyalty of DOJ.6 The fourth section compares the
normative models that attempt to explain the Department's
relationship with agencies.'
The Note will demonstrate that no one model exists to the
exclusion of all others. Rather, the models are simply factors to
consider when describing government action and loyalty. The
situational application of the models shows that they are more
likely to be either post hoc explanations for actions or incom-
plete in their designs. As a consequence, neither DOJ nor indi-
vidual attorneys can use these models for definitive guidance.
The models are useful for analyzing institutional norms for
predictive behavior but not for mandating compliant behavior.
CURRENT LITIGATING AUTHORITY
The current state of government litigation authority is greatly
balkanized."5 Under current law, adopted in 1966, DOJ retains
all authority for agency litigation, "[e]xcept as otherwise autho-
rized by law." 9 This exception enables some forty-one agencies
and government corporations to maintain some authority over
their litigation. ° Litigating authority is divided between DOJ
and the various agencies in every way imaginable.2 The op-
16. See infra notes 153-86 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 187-297 (describing the public interest model, the agency-client
model, and the executive client model).
18. See Griffin B. Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal Government's Chief
Lawyer and Chief Litigator, or One Among Many?, 46 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1049, 1057-
58 (1978) (arguing for DOJ representation of agencies as a means of bringing unifor-
mity to government legal positions).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1988) (emphasis added); see also id. §§ 517, 518 (authorizing
the attorney general and the solicitor general to conduct and argue cases in state,
federal, and international courts). Agency heads generally are not permitted to em-
ploy counsel in litigation but are required to refer matters to DOJ. 5 U.S.C. § 3106
(1988).
20. For an extensive accounting of all government entities with litigation control,
see FED. PROGRAMS BRANCH, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF DEPARTMENTS
AND AGENCIES WITH AUTHORITY EITHER BY STATUTE OR AGREEMENT TO REPRESENT
THEMSELVES IN CIVIL LITIGATION (rev. ed. 1993) (on file with Author) [hereinafter
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE COMPENDIUM], and OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, ADMIN. CON-
FERENCE OF THE U.S., MULTI-MEMBER INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES: A PRE-
LIMINARY SURVEY OF THEIR ORGANIZATION (rev. ed. 1992) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY
SURVEY] (discussing the litigation authority of 19 independent agencies).
21. See Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control over
1996] 1573
1574 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1569
tions range from agencies that have litigating authority before
all courts on all matters to agencies that have limitations on the
subject matter on which, or the court before which, the agency
can practice." Of course, some statutes are ambiguous as to the
grant of litigating authority, which creates even more conflict.'U
Formal and informal agreements between DOJ and agencies
also divide litigating authority. Memoranda of Understanding
(MOUs) allow an agency to handle relatively small and simple
matters specific to that agency.' These agreements establish
formal demarcation lines and are difficult to change.' Because
the Department does not normally abdicate its litigating author-
ity, MOUs often occur when Congress has threatened to statuto-
rily remove its authority or to clarify statutory grants of litigat-
ing authority.2"
Informal agreements vary from phone agreements to letters of
agreement." Most of these arrangements allow the agency to
litigate and settle most matters unless the Assistant Attorney
General believes it is necessary for DOJ to settle an issue.28
Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REv. 255, 264 (1994).
22. See id. The Federal Election Commission can litigate any issue before any
court, including the Supreme Court. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(b) (1988); 26 U.S.C. §§ 9010(a),
9040(a) (1988). The Department of Agriculture can litigate only some matters before
all courts. 7 U.S.C. § 228a (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 2350(a) (1988). The Department of
Health and Human Services can also litigate before all courts on some matters. 42
U.S.C. § 405(l) (1988).
23. See Devins, supra note 21, at 275 n.104 (discussing confusion regarding the
authority of the Tennessee Valley Authority and the National Labor Relations Board
to litigate before the Supreme Court).
24. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Representation of the FDIC
and the RTC by the Civil Division of the Department of Justice in Litigation, in 3
DEPIT OF JUSTICE MANUAL 4-120.1 (Supp. 1992-1); DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE COMPEN-
DIUM, supra note 20, apps. The Department of Labor, the Environmental Protection
Agency, and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration also have MOUs on
litigating authority.
25. MOUs usually are approved at the Secretary level and can be the subject of
congressional oversight. Consequently, they tend to be made and changed very delib-
erately.
26. The DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE COMPENDIUM, supra note 20, cites only 11 MOUs
designed to clarify statutory grants of litigation authority, see Proceedings of the 40th
Annual Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 85 F.R.D. 155, 176
(1979) (statement by I. Michael Greenberger).
27. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE COMPENDIUM, supra note 20, at 7-1 to -16.
28. Id.
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Informal agreements can be more attractive to DOJ because
they enable the Department to become involved at its choice.
Although the Department of Justice retains the legal power to
represent the government in most areas, it is far from monolith-
ic in the way in which it employs its attorneys for representa-
tion.29 Within the Department, loyalty varies according to tai-
lored roles."0 The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), for example,
may be asked to render important prelitigation opinions, review
pending legislation, or resolve interagency disputes.3 ' The OLC
likely will promote executive policy when reviewing legislation
but will act neutrally or quasi-judicially when resolving con-
flicts." Similarly, other divisions may review less divisive deci-
sions as well as litigate or settle matters for an agency,3 3 as-
sume litigation responsibility upon appeal or for government-
wide issues,3 4 or litigate for an agency before the Supreme
Court.35 While a DOJ attorney may be able to determine the
course of litigation at the trial level, she may feel compelled to
support the agency argument on appeal because of loyalty.
36
The Solicitor General's office is much less encumbered by the
restrictions on litigating authority and loyalty toward an agency.
Of the more than forty-one agencies and government corpora-
tions that have independent litigating authority, less than ten
possess the power to litigate before the Supreme Court .37 As a
result, the Solicitor General is most often concerned with creat-
29. MEADOR, supra note 7, at 15-18.
30. JAMES M. STRINE, THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL: LEGAL PROFESSIONALS IN A
POLITICAL SYSTEM 24-25 (1992). For further discussion of the theory of role as deter-
mining loyalty, see infra notes 124-52 and accompanying text.
31. McGinnis, supra note 6, at 423.
32. See Kmiec, supra note 9, at 374; Lund, supra note 9, at 480; McGinnis, supra
note 6, at 422.
33. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1988).
34. E.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of Justice and
the Department of Labor Regarding Litigation Arising Under the Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and
the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act of 1974, in DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMPENDIUM, supra note 20, app. T-1.
35. See generally DONALD L. HOROWiTz, THE JUROCRACY 73-116 (1977) (detailing
potential DOJ roles in agency litigation).
36. See id. at 62-66.
37. See PRELIMINARY SURVEY, supra note 20, at 1-21; Devins, supra note 21, at
278; Olson, supra note 11, at 73.
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ing a unified body of law for the government,"5 and his client is
most often the government as a whole, or the executive branch in
particular, rather than an individual agency.39 The Solicitor
General can use his power to affect policy by choosing not to
pursue Supreme Court review of lower court decisions evaluating
agency conduct.4" The Solicitor General's office has asserted
that it has a special loyalty to the Court because of this
gatekeeping function.4 To maintain its credibility with the
Court, it may attempt to avoid the appearance of partisanship.42
The many exceptions to the rule that DOJ has control over
government litigation reflect on the loyalty expected from the
Department. Arguably, decentralization demonstrates that Con-
gress does not expect the Department to be loyal to agency inter-
ests in representation. When an agency's priorities are legiti-
mate but diverge from executive policy, Congress can award it
with its own litigating authority. To avoid this emasculation of
power, the DOJ attorneys constantly balance their competing
loyalties to the president as advocates, to the courts as officers,
to the public to remain objective, and to agencies in need of fair
representation. Inevitably, the divided loyalties create acrimony
among these parties. While some consider the exercise of inde-
pendent judgment a virtue, others see it as a violation of the
ethical boundaries of representation and as an abuse of DOJ's
control of litigation authority.
38. See generally REBECCA M. SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF
LAW (1992) (viewing the solicitor general as an advocate for the executive branch).
39. LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE 91 (1987); CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND
LAW 189 (1991); Erwin N. Griswold, The Office of the Solicitor General-Representing
the Interests of the United States Before the Supreme Court, 34 Mo. L. REV. 527, 535
(1969); Ronald S. Chamberlain, Note, Mixing Politics and Justice: The Office of Solic-
itor General, 4 J.L. & POL. 379, 420 (defending former Solicitor General Charles
Fried's use of partisan advocacy on historical grounds). But see Note, The Solicitor
General and Intragovernmental Conflict, 76 MICH. L. REV. 324, 349 (1977) (stating
that the solicitor general's first loyalty must be to the executive agencies).
40. See Wade H. McCree, Jr., The Solicitor General and His Client, 59 WASH. U.
L.Q. 337, 341 (1982) ("[I]t is the duty of the Solicitor General to serve as a first-line
gatekeeper for the Supreme Court and to say 'no' to many government officials.").
41. See id. at 345; Eric Schnapper, Becket at the Bar-The Conflicting Obligations
of the Solicitor General, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1187, 1193-96 (1988).
42. See Schnapper, supra note 41, at 1202-06.
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BEHAVIORAL MODELS OF LOYALTY
Historical Role of Loyalty
A brief overview of the history of DOJ provides insight into
varying approaches toward the loyalty question. Ambivalence
about the role of the attorney general that has existed since the
country's inception continues in modern government. History is
marked with a few strong-willed attorneys general and presi-
dents committed to consolidating litigating authority and power
within one office. Despite those efforts, however, gradual ero-
sions of power have kept executive and legislative powers in
balance. The swing of the pendulum slowly created the current
structure of loyalty at DOJ.
Until the creation of the Department of Justice in 1870,"3 the
legal work of the government belonged to the Office of the Attor-
ney General." While the attorney general's main duties in-
volved rendering legal opinions for the executive branch and
conducting the federal government's litigation in the Supreme
Court, he had no department or personnel to control and was a
relatively minor figure in government.45 The job was not even
full time, as he operated out of his own law office.46
Initially, Congress did not clearly define the scope of the
office's duties or to whom the office owed its loyalties.47 Con-
gress gave the president the power to appoint but not to remove
the attorney general, as the removal power implicated more
"core" presidential advisers such as those at the Treasury, War,
and Foreign Affairs Departments.48 The attorney general had
43. An Act to Establish the Department of Justice, ch. 150, § 1, 16 Stat. 162, 162
(1870).
44. The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided for the appointment of "a meet person,
learned in the law, to act as attorney-general for the United States." An Act to
Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 30, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 93
(1789).
45. Id.; MEADOR, supra note 7, at 6.
46. See Sewall Key, The Legal Work of the Federal Government, 25 VA. L. REV.
165, 176 (1938).
47. See MEADOR, supra note 7, at 5-9.
48. Susan L. Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional
Scheme: In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561, 634-35 ("The
history does suggest that law enforcement was not as 'core' a presidential function
as foreign affairs and war were.").
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no control over the conduct of litigation for most of the federal
government because the appointment of United States attorneys
was left to the district and circuit court judges.49
The apparent congressional fear of centralized control was the
product of two concerns: first, the belief that the government
attorney was "quasi-judicial" in nature, owing loyalty to the
court;5" and second, the fear that the office would "become a
center of federal power that would infringe upon the preroga-
tives of the states."51
Congress's fear of centralized control in the executive branch
led to decentralized litigating authority. Congress failed to as-
sign new legal business to the attorney general, despite presi-
dential complaints and proposals for a more unified approach to
government litigation.52 In 1820, Congress created the Comp-
troller of the Treasury, who was responsible for recovering mon-
ey and property due the government.5 In 1830, Congress creat-
ed the Solicitor of the Treasury.' Amazingly, he exercised con-
trol over United States attorneys, while the attorney general did
not.55 After this experiment, Congress created solicitors in most
49. An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 30, § 35, 1
Stat. 73, 92 (1789); NANCY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND POLITICS IN
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, 1789-1990, at 48 (1992) (explaining the Attorney
General's "officer" status for executive appointment).
50. See BAKER, supra note 49, at 47.
51. LUTHER A. HUSTON, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 7 (1967). But see Bloch,
supra note 48, at 636 (asserting that Congress intended to create an office flexible
enough to meet existing needs).
52. In 1791, President George Washington submitted a proposal that, although it
never passed, would have required United States attorneys to report to the attorney
general. MEADOR, supra note 7, at 6. In 1830, Andrew Jackson submitted a law
department bill that Daniel Webster defeated. Id. at 7. Congress ignored James
Polk's 1845 recommendation that the attorney general become an equal cabinet posi-
tion, and an 1850 proposal under Franklin Pierce, to create a Department of Justice,
was tabled. Id.
53. Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 107, § 1, 3 Stat. 592, 592 (current version vesting
recovery power in the attorney general at 31 U.S.C. § 3545 (1994)); see MEADOR,
supra note 7, at 7 (noting the comptroller's early lack of success in recovering mon-
ey).
54. Act of May 29, 1830, ch. 153, § 1, 4 Stat. 414, 414 (current version vesting
recovery power in the attorney general at 31 U.S.C. § 3545).
55. Id. § 5, 4 Stat. at 415; see also MEADOR, supra note 7, at 7 (citing HOMER
CUMMINGS & CARL MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE 146 (1937) and discussing the
congressional compromise regarding the scope of the solicitor's duties).
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of the major executive departments over the next thirty years,56
thereby demonstrating that the attorney general was not the
only person who could represent the United States in court.57
Despite these congressional limitations, many presidents re-
garded the Office of the Attorney General as an integral part of
the executive branch. 8 President Andrew Jackson exemplified
this expectation of loyalty. During his attempt to dismantle the
National Bank, he told Attorney General John Berrien: "[Ylou
must find a law authorizing the act or I will appoint an Attorney
General who will." 9 For Jackson and other presidents, there
was no question that the attorney general's job was to imple-
ment executive policy in the courts."
The notion that the attorney general was quasi-judicial in
nature disappeared with the activism of Caleb Cushing, whom
President Franklin Pierce appointed attorney general in 1852.61
Cushing expanded the office to a full-time position with as many
duties as he could find.62 He unabashedly used the law to ac-
complish specific executive policy goals throughout his tenure."
In fact, Chief Justice Taney relied upon his support of the vigor-
ous enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law in deciding Dred
Scott v. Sandford.'
Cushing's most telling remarks concerning the position of the
56. See CORNELL W. CLAYTON, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: THE ATToRNEY GENERAL
AND THE MAKING OF LEGAL POLICY 23 (1992).
57. Despite this fear based on federalism, Congress continued to give the attorney
general many duties with no logical rationale. See Bell, supra note 18, at 1052.
58. See CLAYTON, supra note 56, at 16-17 (noting that presidents included the at-
torney general in their cabinets).
59. Arthur S. Miller, The Attorney General As the President's Lawyer, in ROLES OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 41, 51 (1968) (quoting President Andrew Jackson). Berrien
resigned and Roger Taney, who zealously opposed the National Bank for Jackson,
was appointed. CLAYTON, supra note 56, at 18.
60. President Monroe had proclaimed 14 years earlier, in 1817, that the attorney
general was an equal member of the executive cabinet. BAKER, supra note 49, at 57
(citing Monroe's Letter to Mr. Lowndes, in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS 1801-1823, at
418 (1834)).
61. Id. at 71-77.
62. CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 55, at 149-51.
63. BAKER, supra note 49, at 74-76 (describing how Cushing's political advocacy
while in office often undermined proper law enforcement).
64. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); see 7 Op. Att'y Gen. 571 (1855); BAKER, supra
note 49, at 75.
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attorney general were in an opinion in which he argued that the
office had, through tradition and time, become subordinated to
the president."5 He denounced the fragmentation of litigating
authority as the prime cause for impeding the creation of a uni-
form government policy.66 This belief finally led Congress to
give the attorney general control over the United States attor-
neys.67 More importantly, this congressional action signaled an
acceptance at many political levels that the attorney general was
a legitimate agent of the President."
Centralization and executive control culminated in the post-
Civil War creation of DOJ.69 Nonetheless, the old laws granting
the various solicitors power were never repealed.70 Despite the
law that required all executive branch solicitors and attorneys to
be "under the supervision and control" of the Attorney Gener-
al,7' department solicitors clung to their enumerated powers
under the old laws in an effort to preserve their power.72
This frustration of congressional intent continued to expand
until 1918, when President Wilson, through an executive or-
der,7" required all executive law officers to operate under the
supervision and control of DOJ for the duration of World War
65. See Office and Duties of Attorney General, 6 Op. Atey Gen. 326, 330 (1854).
66. See id. at 347-51.
67. Act of Aug. 2, 1861, ch. 37, § 1, 12 Stat. 285, 285 (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 519 (1994)). But see MEADOR, supra note 7, at 9 (noting that confusion over
control still remained).
68. Other attorneys general were not advocates like Cushing. Edward Bates, attor-
ney general under President Lincoln, once said: "The office I hold is not properly
political, but is strictly legal; and it is my duty, above all ministers of State to up-
hold the Law . . . ." Miller, supra note 59, at 51. Nevertheless, the impact of those
who brought the attorney general into the policy realm of the executive irrevocably
changed the nature of the office. For a contrast of advocate-minded and neutral
attorneys general, see generally BAKER, supra note 49, at 4-36 (classifying prior
attorneys general as advocates or neutral-minded).
69. Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, § 1, 16 Stat. 162, 162 (1870) (current version
at 28 U.S.C. § 501 (1994)). Congress created the Department because the various
solicitors were unable to handle the load or afford the contracts for private attor-
neys. See CLAYTON, supra note 56, at 24-25; MEADOR, supra note 7, at 9.
70. Bell, supra note 18, at 1054.
71. Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, § 3, 16 Stat. at 162.
72. See BAKER, supra note 49, at 63; Bell, supra note 18, at 1054.
73. See Key, supra note 46, at 190 n.94 (quoting Exec. Order No. 2877 (1918)).
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L' The confusion over a coherent government litigation policy
resumed in the 1920s, however, and individual agencies pursued
their own litigation.75
The swing between centralization and erosion of litigating
authority continued beyond the 1920s, further confusing the
loyalties within DOJ. The advent of a large administrative state
created new problems for the Department. Particularly, in-
creased specialization of attorneys within the Department grew
as new agencies emerged.76 Decentralizing litigating authority
then became an acceptable political tool of Congress,77 and in-
dependent agencies with their own litigating authority enabled
greater legislative steering and less executive influence.7"
The collision of law and policy occurred as more lawyers be-
came specialized in agency, rather than executive branch, repre-
sentation.7" Parochial agency needs soon became confused with
the concept of a consistent government position in court.8 0 This
decentralization resulted more from political maneuvering than
from a coherent legal policy."
74. BAKER, supra note 49, at 63.
75. Executive law officers were so splintered that the attorney general had control
of less than 13% of government lawyers. Id. at 64 (citing Bell, supra note 18, at
1056).
76. By 1904, the Department had eight assistant attorneys general, some of whom
were assigned to other agencies. MEADOR, supra note 7, at 11.
77. Devins, supra note 21, at 278-80.
78. For example, the Interstate Commerce Commission is authorized to bring an
enforcement action in civil court under 49 U.S.C. § 11702 (1988); the Securities and
Exchange Commission, established in 1934 by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
ch. 404, § 4, 48 Stat. 881, 885 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1976)), can seek injunc-
tions under § 78a(d) of the Act; the National Labor Relations Board, established in
1935 by the Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, § 3(i), 49 Stat. 449, 451 (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 153(a) (1970)), has the power to prevent unfair labor practices under §
160(a) of the Act, see also ROBERT E. CuSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY
COMMISSIONS 46 (Octagon Books 1972) (1941) (discussing the perceived benefits of
administrative regulation of the railroads).
79. On the interrelation of law and policy for the attorney general, see CLAYTON,
supra note 56, at 120-37 (describing the political alliance between the executive and
the attorney general).
80. The Department of Justice had control of only 13% of agency counsels in
1928. See Bell, supra note 18, at 1056.
81. For a deeper analysis of the strategic considerations surrounding DOJ power
and litigation authority, see STRINE, supra note 30, at 52-72. See generally BAKER,
supra note 49, at 22-27 (discussing the relationship between law, politics, and the
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Repeated presidential attempts to reassert control over the
haphazard maze of litigating authority provided brief relief from
decentralization. In 1933, President Roosevelt signed Executive
Order 6166, which transferred all of the government's legal
power to DOJ.s2 Under President Eisenhower, the Second Hoo-
ver Commission" reported that the fragmentation of legal ser-
vices harmed efficiency, coordination, and policy, and it recom-
mended that the Department consolidate all legal services."
The Commission also recommended a separate civil service
system for lawyers to ensure that legal decisions were not influ-
enced by politicians "or career civil servants tied to agency
goals."' This recommendation was a bold assertion that gov-
ernment lawyers should not be the advocates of partisan policy.
The proposal was rejected resoundingly by Congress as being too
focused on legalistic considerations and too detrimental to the
congressional oversight of agencies.8
Concerns over DOJ's loyalty accompanied the trend toward
decentralization. When President Kennedy appointed his brother
as attorney general, members of Congress began to question the
attorney general's ability to protect the interests of all govern-
ment in administering and interpreting the law.87 Under Presi-
dent Nixon, few questioned that Attorney General John Mitchell
attorney general).
82. Section 5 of the order reads in part:
The functions of prosecuting in the courts of the United States claims
and demands by and offenses against the Government of the United
States and of defending claims and demands against the Government,
and of supervising the work of the United States attorneys, marshals,
and clerks in connection therewith, now exercised by any agency or offi-
cer, are transferred to the Department of Justice.
Exec. Order No. 6166, reprinted in 77 CONG. REC. 5707-08 (1933). The political
struggles of government lawyers during this period are examined in PETER H. IRONS,
THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS (1982); see also Bell, supra note 18, at 1056 (discussing
Roosevelt's Executive Order).
83. COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERN-
MENT, TASK FORCE REPORT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE (1955).
84. Id. at 7-9. The Commission focused on integrating bureaucracies by removing
political influence. See STRINE, supra note 30, at 71.
85. STRINE, supra note 30, at 71.
86. See id. at 71-72.
87. See id. at 88.
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decided most issues with fierce loyalty toward the President.88
In his study of the Justice Department, John Ingle wrote that
"the department's most pressing problem is neither the Presi-
dent nor Congress. It is the segment of its constituency that be-
lieves.., that Attorney General Mitchell 'has allowed political
strategy to shape law enforcement strategy.'"89
The tide again swung decisively against centralization follow-
ing the Department's humiliation over Watergate. Watergate's
effect on the Department of Justice cannot be understated.
Mitchell's blind allegiance to the President rather than to the
government as a whole contributed to his role in the Watergate
break-in and cover-up.' ° In contrast, the infamous "Saturday
Night Massacre" proved that many in DOJ viewed their client as
the entire government and not the President, who was acting
against the government's best interests.9
Senator Sam Ervin introduced a bill that effectively trans-
formed the Department of Justice into an independent agen-
cy.92 Although the bill failed, it reflected the public opinion of
the time that a neutral Department was needed to enforce the
law adequately. Academics and DOJ attorneys labeled the pro-
posal as undesirable and unnecessary." Most adhered to the
belief that "the Attorney General is a political officer charged
with legal duties."94 Still, the concept of the independent DOJ
88. See BAKER, supra note 49, at 122.
89. John Ingle, CPR Department Study/The Justice Department, 2 NAT'L J. 296,
301 (1970) (quoting the Ripon Society).
90. See BAKER, supra note 49, at 124-25. In 1975, Mitchell was convicted for his
role in Watergate and served 19 months in jail. Id. at 124.
91. The "Saturday Night Massacre" refers to Nixon's attempt to fire Special Pros-
ecutor Archibald Cox in October 1973. Attorney General Elliot Richardson, resigned,
and his deputy was fired for not completing the order. See BAKER, supra note 49, at
140.
92. See Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Judiciary Comm. on S.2803 and
S.2978, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974) [hereinafter 1974 Senate Hearings].
93. Id. at 1-247 (Statements of 14 of the 17 witnesses opposed an independent
DOJ, though many supported independent special prosecutors.); CLAYTON, supra note
56, at 103, 105. In addition, many commentators believed that constitutional
challenges to an independent DOJ could be raised under Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52 (1926), and Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
See, e.g., STRINE, supra note 30, at 91-100 (discussing this conditional challenge).
94. Miller, supra note 59, at 51.
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retained supporters well into the 1980s."5
The attorneys general who followed recognized the crisis cre-
ated by excessive executive loyalty and the need for a degree of
independence within DOJ to restore confidence in the institu-
tion.9" President Ford appointed legal academic and Washing-
ton outsider Edward Levi as attorney general. 7 The nonparti-
san Levi carefully steered DOJ toward a practice of separating
policy from legal reasoning, serving the public interest through
neutral principles, and staying loyal to the Department as an
institution.98
Under President Carter, Attorney General Griffin Bell contin-
ued the trend Levi had started.9 He opposed a formalized, in-
dependent Department but did as much as possible to insulate
the Department from policy decisions at the White House. °° At
the same time, he strongly recommended centralized control of
litigating authority.'0 ' His belief was that agencies were less
accountable than DOJ and created conflicting, inconsistent, and
excessive litigation.' 2 Insisting that agency counsels did not
have the professionalism and loyalty to the executive that DOJ
lawyers did, he asserted that a majority of government litigation
and policy problems could be avoided if routed through DOJ,
thereby eliminating the "Balkanization of authority."' ° Bell's
independence, however, upset many at the White House, who
accused the Department of being its own client when it ignored
both agency and White House views.0 4
95. See Mitchell Rogovin, Reorganizing Politics Out of the Department of Justice,
64 A.B.A. J. 855 (1978) (criticizing the current attorney general scheme).
96. See BAKER, supra note 49, at 140-65.
97. Nomination of Edward Levi To Be Attorney General: Hearings Before the Sen-
ate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1975) [hereinafter Levi Hear-
ings]. Levi was the former president of the University of Chicago and was not a
personal acquaintance of President Ford. BAKER, supra note 49, at 141-43.
98. He had not registered with any political party for many years before his ap-
pointment. BAKER, supra note 49, at 143, 150 (citing Levi Hearings, supra note 97).
99. Id. at 151.
100. Id. at 151-65.
101. Griffin B. Bell, Office of the Attorney General's Client Relationship, 36 BUS.
LAW. 791, 792 (1981).
102. GRIFFIN B. BELL & RONALD J. OSTROW, TAKING CARE OF THE LAW 173 (1982).
103. Id.
104. BAKER, supra note 49, at 162.
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The policy of a neutral Department quickly changed under the
Reagan Administration. Reagan's closest adviser, Attorney Gen-
eral Edwin Meese, openly supported executive policy deci-
sions."5 Reagan appointees used the political agenda of
Reagan's campaign to establish "policy goals" for the
Department.'06
For example, soon after his appointment, Attorney General
William French Smith, President Reagan's attorney general
during his first term, reversed the position of the United States
in several cases to support Reagan's policies. 7 Most notably,
under pressure from Meese and others in the White House, he
convinced the Solicitor General's office under Rex Lee to reverse
its position before the Supreme Court on a discrimination issue
in Bob Jones University v. United States.' Loyalty apparently
did not fully filter through the institution, however, as Deputy
Solicitor Lawrence Wallace submitted the brief with the caveat
that the Solicitor General did not support the government's posi-
tion.' o9 Throughout Reagan's tenure, both solicitors general re-
fused to allow the attorney general to dictate their positions
absolutely."0 Solicitor General Charles Fried, who succeeded
Rex Lee, later explained that Reagan had appointed him with
the expectation that he would exercise independent judg-
ment."' Though fiercely loyal to Reagan, he determined that
he could not predict what Reagan's position would be on every
decision."' As a result, Fried occasionally differed with the at-
105. Id. at 97.
106. Id.
107. See CLAYTON, supra note 56, at 55. Smith had been Reagan's personal attor-
ney prior to his appointment. Id. at 51.
108. 461 U.S. 574 (1983); BAKER, supra note 49, at 99.
109. The Supreme Court ruled against the United States. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at
576; see Brief for the United States at I, Goldsboro Christian Sch., Inc. v. United
States and Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (Nos. 81-1, 81-3).
See generally CAPLAN, supra note 39, at 51-64 (describing the circumstances sur-
rounding Bob Jones).
110. See FRIED, supra note 39, at 182-83; Rex Lee, Lawyering for the Government:
Politics, Polemics, and Principle, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 595, 595-97 (1986) (asserting that
a government lawyer has an enhanced duty to the court but can argue political
issues if appropriate).
111. FRIED, supra note 39, at 191.
112. See id. ("Public office is an interpretive activity. The officer tries to make the
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torney general and the White House."' In maintaining his eth-
ic, Fried received criticism from both sides as being too politi-
cally involved but not loyal to the administration.""
Some other offices within DOJ also asserted their indepen-
dence during Fried's tenure as solicitor general. As a whole,
however, the attorney general and DOJ once again became vehi-
cles for policy implementation." 5 The swing of the pendulum,
which continues into the 1990s, assures an ongoing struggle
between the president and Congress over DOJ loyalty.
The executive and legislative skirmishes over DOJ loyalty
rarely spill into the arena of the courts. Historically, however,
the judiciary has firmly favored unified control in the Depart-
ment of Justice. In 1866, the Court held that no department
could oppose the attorney general in court."6 Two years later,
it confirmed the attorney general's power to dismiss cases in the
lower courts brought in the name of the United States."' The
Court's most pronounced statement on the subject came in Unit-
ed States v. San Jacinto Tin Co.,"' in which it described the
attorney general as "the officer who has charge of the institution
and conduct of the pleas of the United States, and of the litiga-
tion which is necessary to establish the rights of the govern-
ment.""' The Court tried to give the attorney general as much
legal responsibility as possible, interpreting ambiguities against
agency litigation.20 Favoring a coherent, unified approach to
best sense out of his assignment.").
113. Id. at 188-92.
114. See, e.g., CAPLAN, supra note 39, at 255-67 (stating that the solicitor general
position was eroded by the activism of the Reagan Administration); John 0.
McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics: The Solicitor General's Office in Constitutional
and Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L. REV. 799, 804 (1992) (reviewing FRIED, supra
note 39, and asserting that the president is the solicitor general's client); Erwin N.
Griswold, Book Review, CONST., Spring-Summer 1991, at 73, 73 (reviewing FRIED,
supra note 39). But see Roger Clegg, The Thirty-Fifth Law Clerk, 1987 DUKE L.J.
964 (criticizing Caplan as disingenuous).
115. The OLC, for instance, asserted itself as an office that settled issues with
objective, professional legal analysis. See McGinnis, supra note 6, at 423-24. For a
debate on the value of the OLC's quasi-judicial development, see Kmiec, supra note
9, at 372-74; Lund, supra note 9, at 441-59.
116. The Gray Jacket, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 342, 371 (1866).
117. Confiscation Cases, 79 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 458-59 (1868).
118. 125 U.S. 273 (1887).
119. Id. at 279.
120. Marshall v. Gibson's Prods. Inc., 584 F.2d 668, 676 n.11 (5th Cir. 1978) ("[I]n
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government representation enabled courts to render consistent
decisions on government action and to keep dockets manageable.
The courts were frustrated, however, by the continued specific
statutory grants of power to agencies. 2'
Historical analysis shows that the goal of centralized litigat-
ing authority has been a continuing battle for presidents. The
often random conferral of agency litigation powers frustrates
executive attempts at consolidation.' A cycle has developed in
our history, such that when a strong executive figure exercises
control over litigation, Congress, through time, erodes this pow-
er. John Davis best states this pattern:
[Tihere has been a continuing effort by Attorneys General to
centralize responsibility for all government litigation in Jus-
tice, a continuing effort by many agencies to escape from that
control with respect to civil litigation, and a practice by Con-
gress of accepting the positions of the Attorneys General in
principle and then cutting them to pieces by exceptions."
The result is that, while history reveals interesting attempts at
defining DOJ loyalty, no clear model emerges as instructive. The
swing of the pendulum represents a balance of power between
the branches of government. This power dynamic may foretell
the eventual demise of any of the normative models.
The Bureaucratic Model
The bureaucratic model is based on the reality that maximiz-
ing departmental power is a critical factor in decisionmaking. If
DOJ chooses its litigation policy with its own interests in mind,
then it is acting as its own client.
When the Solicitor General chooses not to file a certiorari
petition on an agency case because the argument is too political,
he does so to maintain the institutional political capital of the
the absence of an express congressional directive to the contrary, [the attorney gen-
eral] is vested with plenary power over all litigation to which the United States or
one of its agencies is a party."). For a more historical perspective, see Key, supra
note 46, at 181-85.
121. See BAKER, supra note 49, at 64-65; CLAYTON, supra note 56, at 74.
122. Devins, supra note 21, at 278-80.
123. Davis, supra note 10, at 17.
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solicitor general's office."2 When OLC issues a neutral opinion
on an agency position, it secures its own position in government
by providing an avenue through which DOJ can review agency
litigation policy.'25 When DOJ drafts briefs for litigation in a
manner different than an agency's preference, it asserts its au-
thority over agency policy. 2'
A main consideration of the Department of Justice is consis-
tency in litigation.27 Uniformity of legal positions creates more
need for centralized litigation, which is more efficient because it
avoids duplication among many agencies." DOJ's expertise in
litigation develops and attracts objective litigation experts 9
who are better suited to represent the government than are
inexperienced agency lawyers with "parochial interests.""0
Courts and the public then look to the Department to reconcile
inconsistencies within agencies."'
DOJ often chooses not to litigate when an agency would
choose to do so because it does not want to risk losing political
capital. "While the agency lawyers are concerned with one piece
of litigation and one program at a time, the Justice lawyers are
watchful of the effect of any single lawsuit on the whole run of
their litigation, both pending and future.""2 DOJ runs the risk
of alienating the courts by establishing bad precedent or arguing
politically novel concepts too often."' Expertise in litigation
124. See e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Lee, supra
note 110, at 597-99.
125. See McGinnis, supra note 6, at 421-35.
126. See e.g., United States v. Sandstrom, 22 F. Supp. 190, 191 (N.D. Okla. 1938)
(stating that, once a matter is referred to DOJ, the referring agency ceases to have
control over it).
127. Responsibilities of the Attorney General Re Civil Litigation, in 3 DEP'T OF JUS-
TICE MANUAL 4-7 (Supp. 1990-1).
128. Olson, supra note 11, at 78.
129. Id. at 79.
130. Id. at 79-80. How the divisions in litigating authority impact on recruitment
and retention of government lawyers is explored in HOROWITZ, supra note 35, at 26-
37. Everyone interviewed for this Note acknowledged the rift of elitism caused by
DOJ control over litigation and the resulting agency inexperience in handling legal
issues. See sources cited infra notes 136, 140.
131. HOROWITZ, supra note 35, at 45 ('[Bjecause Justice is constantly in court, it
must worry about the esteem in which it is held by the judiciary ... .
132. Id.
133. Lee, supra note 110, at 601 (describing the solicitor general's role as steward
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that is detached from the business of policy or administration
maintains the Department's institutional credibility."M
By contrast, there is rarely a political cost when DOJ alters or
denies agency litigation. DOJ is presumed, by statute, to have
litigating authority over agency matters.'35 An agency must
take affirmative action and use its own resources to question
DOJ's presumed authority. Consequently, an agency will pick its
battles cautiously, acquiescing in its role as captive client. 6
A bureaucratic model demonstrates how loyalties often divide
on many levels. For example, it can focus on the divisions among
organizations, such as between agencies.'37 It also can demon-
strate that DOJ uses its reputation as an objective professional
organization to insulate political officers from divisive issues. 38
Decisions that are based on sound legal reasoning but that sup-
port the president's policy preserve executive capital. 9 The re-
sult is a more politically useful DOJ. Finally, bureaucratic mod-
els also may articulate the differing roles of political appointees
and civil service attorneys as a dividing line for loyalties.'
Finally, models may emphasize the division of power accord-
ing to governmental functions. 4  Agencies share functions in
ways that break down the separation of powers barriers between
the executive, legislative, and judicial branches.' Many agen-
of the office's "reservoir of credibility").
134. HOROWrrz, supra note 35, at 130.
135. See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1988); supra note 1.
136. Telephone Interview with John 0. McGinnis, Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law (Feb. 25, 1995) [hereinafter McGinnis Interview].
137. See generally HOROWlrrz, supra note 35, at 37 (discussing the division between
lawyers specializing in an agency's affairs and lawyers responsible for litigating
agency business).
138. See McGinnis, supra note 6, at 424 ("[Ilt is useful for the office [of Legal
Counsel] to cultivate a reputation of applying the law scrupulously without regard to
political or policy interest.").
139. See id.
140. Such models would allow political appointees to act independently but require
civil servants to treat agencies strictly as clients. Interview with James Gardner,
Professor, Western New England College School of Law (Nov. 8, 1994) (former Civil
Division attorney) [hereinafter Gardner Interview]; McGinnis Interview, supra note
136.
141. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Pow-
ers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLuM. L. REv. 573, 577-78 (1984).
142. See HOROWITZ, supra note 35, at 5-23 (emphasizing the structure and hierar-
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cies make, enforce, and adjudicate their own rules. Under
this theory, separate agency functions hinder administrative
power.' Accordingly, decentralized litigation authority en-
ables agencies to function without worrying about DOJ's com-
peting loyalties.
The bureaucratic model also attempts to account for the wide
differences in DOJ actions in each situation. DOJ's decision to
maximize political capital hinges on its role in a given situa-
tion." 5 This role theory focuses on how bureaucrats will act
given their mission (for example: dispute resolution, pre-litiga-
tion advice, litigation strategy, or appellate advocacy) and how
the governmental institution constrains responses. " 6
Other institutions competing for position erode DOJ's tradi-
tional role as the president's counsel. "' For example, both the
White House Counsel (WHC)-a smaller, closer, and more dis-
crete office-and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
are now used more frequently as the "Counsel for the President"
than is the attorney general.'48 This development has attenuat-
ed DOJ's client relationship to the executive. As a result, the
OLC gradually has redefined its role, becoming a more neutral,
quasi-judicial decisionmaker in order to preserve its position in
the bureaucracy.'49
Though preserving agency power may underlie some decisions
chy of positions in a bureaucracy as a definition for the division of authority);
Strauss, supra note 141, at 578 (emphasizing the interaction and informal relation-
ships within a bureaucracy).
143. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140-41 (1976).
144. See Strauss, supra note 141, at 595-96. Strauss concludes that "[the choice of
form [of agencies] has little relation to the work they do or the manner in which
they perform it." Id. Strauss favors a system of checks and balances on agency au-
thority through separation of functions. Id. at 578. A combination of executive and
congressional oversight is an adequate check on agency power. Id. at 581.
145. See STRINE, supra note 30, at 24-30.
146. See id. at 28-29 ("Role theory and analysis is the investigation of shared values
about how an incumbent should perform a job .... [Tihe role concepts and rules ...
that emerge define expected behavior and organizational procedures ... .
147. See id. at 99-100.
148. See Jeremy Rabkin, At the President's Side: The Role of the White House
Counsel in Constitutional Policy, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 80 (1993) (suggest-
ing that, as DOJ placed more emphasis on independence, the White House developed
a greater need for the White House Counsel's guidance).
149. See STRINE, supra note 30, at 312-13; Lund, supra note 9, at 494-95.
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in representing agencies in litigation, it does not completely
explain DOJ's motivation in all situations. The bureaucratic
model cynically assumes that power is the motivating factor in
DOJ action. Supporters explain that apparently objective or
neutral actions help DOJ preserve power by increasing its politi-
cal capital.' In other words, an objective DOJ gains respect
from the executive and other agencies and is therefore more
relied upon and a more important governmental actor.'5 '
The complexity of the bureaucratic model enables it to address
the varied situations faced by the Department in agency repre-
sentation.'52 The bureaucratic model's flaw, however, is that it
is an inherently post hoc explanation for DOJ action. DOJ acts
to further executive policy, promote the public interest, or to
serve agency needs just as often as it acts to promote its own
self-interest. The bureaucratic model closes all discussion of
these motivations by characterizing them as part of a power
struggle.
THE ROLE OF ETHICAL STANDARDS IN DEFINING
LOYALTY
Separate ethical considerations for government lawyers were
not scrutinized carefully until after the Watergate debacle.
After that time, many perceived that the Department's lawyers
were too involved in politics and ignored a special responsibility
they owed to the court and to the public. 5 ' That some gov-
ernment lawyers condoned illegal activities in the name of loy-
alty to the executive was a sign that ethical standards were in
150. See Olson, supra note 11, at 79-80 (stating that DOJ considers its objectivity
as one of the reasons that it is better suited than government agencies to undertake
litigation).
151. See Lee, supra note 110, at 597 ("T]here is a widely held . . . impression
that.. . the Solicitor General's Office provides the Court... with advocacy that is
more objective, more dispassionate, more competent and more respectful of the Court
as an institution than it gets from any other lawyer or group of lawyers.").
152. See CLAYTON, supra note 56, at 141 (describing the transformation of the at-
torney general's position from a "quasi-judicial legal advisor" to "a powerful
policymaking post").
153. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, The Special Responsibility of Lawyers in the Exec-
utive Branch, CmH. B. REC., Special Centennial Issue, 1974, at 4, 12 (arguing for
higher federal bar ethical standards).
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grave need of revision if the legal profession was to continue to
police itself.154
The legal community scrutinized the applicability of ethical
standards to government lawyers during the 1970s.'55 The is-
sue of loyalty now incorporates ethical considerations because of
these carefully reviewed standards. These ethical standards are
not free from controversy, however, because of the issues of
attorney-client privilege and conflicts of interest.5 ' These is-
sues require a determination of who the client is and to whom
an attorney owes loyalty. Unfortunately, a multiplicity of stan-
dards and interpretations has created a confused ethical answer
to the question of loyalty in government service.
The first ambiguity in ethical standards determining govern-
ment attorney loyalty is found in both the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (Model Rules)57 and the ABA Model
Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code).58 Both texts
virtually ignore the special position of a government attorney in
favor of generally applicable rules. 5 9
The Model Code, which was adopted in 1969, establishes the
duty of zealous representation of clients by all lawyers. 6 ' Spe-
cifically, EC 7-14 requires government attorneys to seek justice
and limits the zealousness of their representation when litiga-
154. Archibald Cox, The Lawyer's Public Responsibilities, 4 HUM. RTS. 1, 3 (1974)
(calling for increased ethics education in law school); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Com-
ment, CmI. B. REC., Special Centennial Issue, 1974, at 13, 13-15.
155. See, e.g., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LAWYER 93-113 (Nina M.
Galston ed., 1976); TEACING PROFESSIONAL RESPONSEBiLrrY 1093-1150 (Patrick A.
Keenan ed., 1979).
156. See, e.g., Michael J. Davidson, Yes Virginia, There Is a Federal Agency Attor-
ney-Client Privilege: Its Application to the Federal Agency Client, 41 FED. B. NEWS &
J. 51 (1994); Developments in the Law: Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession,
94 HARv. L. REv. 1244, 1413-50 (1981); Robert P. Lawry, Confidences and the Gov-
ernment Lawyer, 57 N.C. L. REV. 625 (1979); Jack B. Weinstein & Gay A.
Crosthwait, Some Reflections on Conflicts Between Government Attorneys and Clients,
1 TOURO L. REV. 1 (1985); Keller, supra note 4, at 1009-13. See generally William
Josephson & Russell Pearce, To Whom Does the Government Lawyer Owe the Duty of
Loyalty When Clients Are in Conflict?, 29 HoW. L.J. 539 (1986) (examining the con-
flict of interest between public officer and public agency clients at the state level).
157. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT (1995).
158. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1983).
159. See Lanctot, supra note 4, at 967.
160. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7.
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tion is "obviously unfair." 6' While this is not a new concept, it
creates a question as to how much independence a Department
attorney has in representing agency clients. Presumably, the
standard allows the attorney to nullify agency policy decisions
by refusing to litigate. The attorney, then, may have the power
to frustrate executive policy by making an individual determina-
tion of fairness.'62 Similarly, as an institution, DOJ can ethi-
cally limit its representation of clients.
The obvious counterargument to this interpretation of the
Model Code is that it is not the place of unelected civil servants
to frustrate policy. Instead, zealous representation applies equal-
ly to government and private attorneys, and the courts are re-
sponsible for sorting out the unfair cases."c6 The Model Rules,
which were adopted in place of the Model Code in 1983, do not
account for this or any other argument concerning government
attorneys. The preamble provides that all lawyers have a duty to
their clients, the court, and justice but does not differentiate
between private practitioners and government attorneys."'
The Model Rules appear to adopt a view contrary to that in the
Model Code by the statement:
A lawyer's responsibilities as a representative of clients, an
officer of the legal system and a public citizen are usually
harmonious. Thus, when an opposing party is well represent-
ed, a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on behalf of a client
and at the same time assume that justice is being done."
161. Id. at EC 7-14 ("A government lawyer who has discretionary power relative to
litigation should refrain from instituting or continuing litigation that is obviously un-
fair ... A government lawyer in a civil action or administrative proceeding has the
responsibility to seek justice.").
162. But see Eric Schnapper, Legal Ethics and the Government Lawyer, 32 REC.
A.B.N.Y. 649 (1977) (refuting the argument for blindly pursuing agency litigation).
163. For a full exploration of how ethical standards must apply equally to both
government and private attorneys, see generally Lanctot, supra note 4 (linking the
ethical duties of government lawyers to one's views on the adversarial process). But
see Keith W. Donahoe, Note, The Model Rules and the Government Lawyer, A Sword
or Shield? A Response to the D.C. Bar Special Committee on Government Lawyers
and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 987, 1000-02
(1989) (finding that the Model Rules mandate that lawyers seek to serve the public
interest above that of the agency client).
164. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT pmbl. (1995).
165. Id.
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Still, the Model Rules fail to abrogate completely the concept
of a separate standard for government attorneys. The Model
Rules also provide the caveat that government attorneys may
have the "authority to represent the 'public interest' in circum-
stances where a private lawyer would not be authorized to do
so."'66 The Model Rules, however, do not contemplate when
that authority may arise or how far the scope of that authority
reaches. Model Rule 1.13 addresses the issue of representing the
organizational client.'67 The comment to Rule 1.13 attempts to
apply the standards equally to government and private attor-
neys. To do so, the comment suggests that the client of the gov-
ernment attorney is generally the government as a whole, not
the individual agency.'68 The Model Rules appear to step back
from the Model Code's allegiance to the public interest as a
general principle but bring in a substantially similar, subjective
standard by allowing an attorney to determine appropriate liti-
gation strategy according to her assessment of the government's
best interest. 169
The standard set forth in Model Rule 1.13 deserves some
praise for its flexible approach. It presumes that zealous repre-
sentation on the part of the government presents no conflict. At
an institutional level, the rule could allow the executive to be
the Department's client, thereby providing executive oversight of
agency enforcement actions through DOJ. The weakness in Rule
1.13, however, is that it allows an attorney to determine the best
interests of the government, 70 something best left to politically
accountable leadership. In addition, Rule 1.13 appears inconsis-
tent with the Model Rules' earlier reference to service of the
public interest.'7 ' Although the Model Rules present problems,
they at least provide a workable presumption for the develop-
ment of other ethical standards.
To fill the gap left by the Model Rules and Model Code, the
166. Id. Scope.
167. Id. Rule 1.13.
168. See id. Rule 1.13 cmt. 3.





Federal Bar attempted to establish some standards of conduct
for government lawyers. 2 In 1973, the Federal Bar published
Opinion 73-1, which addressed issues involving the government
as a client and confidentiality.' In identifying the government
lawyer's client, the opinion looked at the attorney's duty to serve
the public interest.' 4 The opinion concluded that the govern-
ment attorney's client was the agency in which he was em-
ployed, as long as the agency conducted the public's busi-
ness.' 5 The reference to the public business received criticism
for being too ambiguous."'6 One year later, the Federal Bar
published a more comprehensive look at the ethical problems of
the government lawyer in its Federal Ethics Considerations.
(FEC)."' The FEC codified the point made in Opinion 73-1 in
FEC Canon 518 The Federal Bar also left room for the attor-
ney to use "independent professional judgement."' 9 This lan-
guage is narrower than the broad grant to pursue the public in-
terest found in Opinion 73-1 but is still ambiguous.' 0 Unfortu-
nately, the FEC has seldom been cited by courts and has re-
ceived little attention since its publication.' 8'
As a result of continued ambiguity, the Federal Bar provided
172. See Lanctot, supra note 4, at 969.
173. Federal Bar Ass'n Professional Ethics Comm., The Government Client and
Confidentiality: Opinion 73-1, 32 FED. B.J. 71 (1973) [hereinafter Opinion 73-1].
174. Id. at 72; see also Charles Fahy, Special Ethical Problems of Counsel for the
Government, 33 FED. B.J. 331 (1974) ("It must be borne in mind very heavily that
the chief responsibility of government counsel is to represent the public interest and
not to promote in any manner one's private professional career.").
175. See Opinion 73-1, supra note 173, at 72.
176. See, e.g., Lawry, supra note 6, at 66-71 (arguing that Opinion 73-1 is deeply
flawed and allows the public interest to affect policy decisions about litigation too
easily and suggesting that the attorney-client relationship should apply to those
whom the attorney naturally owes obligations).
177. See C. Normand Poirer, The Federal Government Lawyer and Professional
Ethics, 60 A.B.A. J. 1541, 1542-44 (1974) (containing the full text of the FEC).
178. Id. at 1543 ("The immediate professional responsibility of the federal lawyer is
to the department or agency in which he is employed.") (quoting FEC 5-1).
179. Id.
180. Lanctot, supra note 4, at 970; Daniel Schwartz, The "New" Legal Ethics and
the Administrative Law Bar, in THE GOOD LAWYER 236, 244 (David Luban ed., 1984)
(arguing that Opinion 73-1, by effectively requiring the government attorney to di-
rectly pursue the public interest, creates a confusing standard).
181. Lanctot, supra note 4, at 971.
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detailed ethical rules in 1990 (Federal Model Rules). 182 Like
other ethical attempts to define loyalty, the Federal Bar recog-
nized the special responsibility of the government lawyer, who
must be able to exercise "sensitive professional and moral judge-
ment" when encountering conflicting responsibilities." The
Federal Bar went on to establish the agency as the client who
possesses the ultimate authority to determine the scope of the
litigation under Rule 1.13.'8 The District of Columbia Bar ech-
oed this same opinion, asserting that loyalty to the public inter-
est was too nebulous a concept."
Understanding the ethical standards that apply to the govern-
ment lawyer is important in defining loyalty in government
litigation. The ethical standards now clearly state that an agen-
cy is the client and that, absent illegal or unethical behavior, a
DOJ attorney owes loyalty to that agency. 86 These standards
resolve the issue for the individual attorney but not necessarily
for the institution. The rules were never intended to define
DOJ's role. Historical analysis shows the evolution of loyalty
through practice; ethical analysis gives a theoretical understand-
ing of the individual government lawyer's duty of loyalty. The
normative models of loyalty complete the picture by identifying
and attempting to resolve the institutional conflicts within the
Department of Justice.
182. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR FEDERAL LAWYERS, reprinted in
SELECTED STATUTES, supra note 3, at 560.
183. Id. pmbl.
184. Id. Rule 1.13 ("Unless otherwise specifically provided, the Federal Agency, not
the organizational element, is ordinarily considered the client .... [Tihe client-law-
yer relationship exists between the Government lawyer and the Federal agency, as
represented by the head of the organization."); see id. Rule 1.6 cmt. 1.
185. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR SPECIAL COMMITTEE REPORT ON GOVERNMENT
LAWYERS AND THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, reprinted in WASH.
LAW., Sept.-Oct. 1988, at 53, 54 [hereinafter DC BAR REPORT]. But see Donahoe,
supra note 163, at 993-1002 (criticizing the District of Columbia Bar's conclusions).
186. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR FEDERAL LAWYERS Rule
1.13, reprinted in SELECTED STATUTES, supra note 3, at 597-99.
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NORMATIVE MODELS OF LOYALTY
The Public Interest Model
The model that identifies the public interest as the primary
client of the Department assumes that DOJ has a certain level
of institutional independence. As in the Model Code, the public
interest approach to loyalty assumes that DOJ has a duty great-
er than merely parochial agency interests or partisan executive
interests. DOJ is able to use its discretion to determine how to
best serve the public interest. The only way for this to occur is if
DOJ is unencumbered by loyalties to any one entity.
The first point in support of this model is that the Depart-
ment has a responsibility to act in the most efficient manner
possible.'87 Waste occurs when government spends money lit-
igating an issue that DOJ would not pursue. Instead, DOJ,
agencies, and the judiciary should strive to achieve the same
goals in order to minimize public costs." As a result, the
government lawyer has a special duty to preserve judicial
resources.
8 9
Second, the public interest model recognizes that agency rep-
resentation is not the same as representation of a private indi-
vidual. Eric Schnapper points out that there is no constitutional
guarantee of unlimited agency representation."9 An agency is
not a person with interests separate from the government.'9 '
As a result, representation is only appropriate when the
agency's position reflects public policy. 9 '
Third, the public interest model asserts that a lawyer's duty
to exercise independent judgment and protect the public interest
is the cornerstone of professional responsibility.'9" To ensure
fairness in government action, the lawyer has a special license
187. Schnapper, supra note 41, at 1210-21.
188. See Lee, supra note 110, at 596.
189. Id.
190. See Sclnapper, supra note 162, at 649-50.
191. Lory A. Barsdate, Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for the Government Entity, 97
YALE L.J. 1725, 1738 (1988).
192. See Schnapper, supra note 162, at 650.
193. See generally Steven H. Leleiko, Professional Responsibility and Public Policy
Formation, 49 ALB. L. REV. 403 (1985) (describing the significant role that lawyers
play in public policy formation and suggesting ethical standards to govern that role).
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to use discretion as to which issues do not merit representa-
tion.'" Attorneys have a special duty because of their under-
standing of the law and their role as public servants. 9 ' All of
these points suggest that lawyers within the Department have a
duty to represent the interests of the people and not merely the
concerns of government.'
A separate but related concept of the public interest is the
idea of the entire government as a client.97 According to this
concept, the ultimate client is not the public interest but the
good of the entire government. This model, which arguably pro-
vides for consistent government policy on issues that cross agen-
cy lines, more often is advanced by solicitors general, who are
charged with the broader role of advocating the government's
interests before the Supreme Court. 98 This model may allow
more partisan ideas to creep into policy decisions 9' or it may
mandate the application of neutral principles. °0
The study of ethics and the judiciary provides support for the
public interest model.2"' Scholars looking at broad ethical is-
sues find an attractive logic to holding lawyers responsible to a
greater cause than the immediate client.0 2 Eric Schnapper, for
194. See Weinstein & Crosthwait, supra note 156, at 5.
195. See Harold Levanthal, What the Court Expects of the Federal Lawyer, 27 FED.
B.J. 1, 5-6 (1967).
196. Donahoe, supra note 163, at 997.
197. See, e.g., Robert E. Palmer, The Confrontation of the Legislative and Executive
Branches: An Examination of the Constitutional Balance of Powers and the Role of
the Attorney General, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 331, 351-53 (1984) (arguing that the solicitor
general's and attorney general's ultimate duty is to uphold the Constitution).
198. See sources cited supra note 39.
199. See CAPLAN, supra note 39, at 62-64 (describing how the solicitor general's
office became less independent under Reagan appointee Paul Bator, a "political depu-
ty," to the solicitor general's office).
200. See BELL & OSTROW, supra note 102, at 182; Griswold, supra note 39, at 535
(describing the solicitor general's obligations to aid the Supreme Court and to serve
the government); Lee, supra note 110, at 599-600; Schnapper, supra note 41, at
1202-03 (explaining the solicitor general's duty of complete and balanced disclosure
before the Supreme Court).
201. See, e.g., Levanthal, supra note 195, at 5-6; Weinstein & Crosthwait, supra
note 156, at 9-12.
202. See PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LAWYER, supra note 155, at 95
(stating that government lawyers have the responsibility to determine which matters
are good for government); cf. TEACHING PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note
155, at 1043-1123 (analyzing the problems involved in teaching professional respon-
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example, argues that a government lawyer must use discretion
not to pursue litigation cavalierly and endlessly on behalf of
public agencies." 3 He proposes that an agency only deserves
representation as long as the disputed facts support public poli-
cy.2 Because the government has the advantage of free repre-
sentation and each agency is bound to support public policy,
"government counsel has a greater obligation than that of pri-
vate counsel."2 5
Use of attorney discretion to support the public interest leads
to obvious problems. First, attorneys general, for example, sup-
port such a policy."' Second, individual determinations of pub-
lic policy can be haphazard and inconsistent. Supporters of the
model, however, assert that such a policy permits each govern-
ment lawyer to ensure that government litigation is fair because
lawyers are uniquely able to control government enforcement in
court. Individual determinations, however, undermine a repre-
sentational government designed to exercise the public will.0 7
Third, while injustices do occur, the lawyer may not appreciate
the larger governmental implications from litigation.08 Fourth,
requiring a different standard of conduct for government lawyers
undermines a judicial system based on adversarial representa-
tion.0 9 Equal zeal by participants in litigation is the only way
sibility to federal government attorneys charged with serving the public interest).
203. Schnapper, supra note 162, at 650-51.
204. Id. at 650 ("The decision whether an agency or official is 'entitled' to govern-
ment counsel seems to turn on whether the disputed conduct in fact represents
public policy.").
205. Id. at 655. As such, the government should use restraint in advancing argu-
ments designed to terminate litigation on grounds other than the merits of the case.
Id. at 658.
206. See Josephson & Pearce, supra note 156, at 555 n.75 (citing a survey in which
most state attorneys general viewed their role primarily as representing the agencies
of state government).
207. See id. at 556.
208. The policy of nonacquiescence by the Social Security Administration had a
negative effect on many individuals yet served a definite policy objective. See Samuel
Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies,
98 YALE L.J. 679, 692-704 (1989).
209. See Lanctot, supra note 4, at 958 (asserting that government attorneys should
not substitute their own judgments of "justice" and "fairness" for those made by the
officials whom they represent within the adversary system).
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to ensure fair representation of all interests.210 Catherine
Lanctot summarized this position by stating: "For better or
worse, the American political system places the burden of deter-
mining the 'fairness' or 'justice' of public policy upon elected
officials in the first instance and, ultimately, upon the
courts."211 Fifth, the developers of federal ethical standards
rejected this approach and decided that there must be a dis-
cernible agency client who dictates the scope of representa-
tion.2 An agency, represented by its agency head, best char-
acterizes the client under the ethical standards.1 3 To hold
otherwise would give an unacceptable amount of discretion to
the individual lawyer. 4
The courts prefer the public interest model because it empow-
ers government attorneys to act as gatekeepers who manage the
courts' burden.215 This is a cynical but true statement. Al-
though courts seek to restrain agency discretion, they accept
that discretion and embrace agency self-regulation."6 Similar-
ly, courts recognize DOJ's ability to speak with a voice that
"reflects not the parochial interests of a particular agency, but
the common interests of the Government and therefore of all the
people."217
Despite selfish rationales for the public interest model, judges,
acting responsibly, are quick to find fault with any wrongdoing
by a government lawyer.218 In fact, the issue usually arises
when there has been some sort of attorney misconduct.2 9
210. See id.
211. Id. at 1014.
212. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOR FEDERAL LAWYERS Rule
1.13, reprinted in SELECTED STATUTES, supra note 3, at 597-99; supra notes 182-86
and accompanying text.
213. See Josephson & Pearce, supra note 156, at 562-69 (criticizing the public inter-
est approach as creating divided loyalties that are counter to representational gov-
ernment and inconsistent with ethical standards).
214. Id. at 564 ("Such a lawyer is not a lawyer representing a client but a lawyer
representing herself.").
215. See Richard M. Thomas, Prosecutorial Discretion and Agency Self-Regulation:
CNI v. Young and the Aflatoxin Dance, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 142-43 (1992).
216. See id. at 156.
217. United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 706 (1988) (dismissing
the Special Prosecutor's petition to represent the United States before the Court).
218. See Lanctot, supra note 4, at 990.
219. See United States v. Sumitomo Marine, 617 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1980) (impos-
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Courts are insistent that the government attorney seek justice
just as do the courts."' The Supreme Court's statement from
1935 still rings true for most judges:
The United States [aittorney is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obliga-
tion to govern at all; and whose interest... is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.221
Because most courts address the issue of loyalty when there has
been wrongdoing, it is difficult to determine if many courts view
the public interest model as being applicable when the choice to
litigate is purely a policy decision. The assumption that an indi-
vidual government attorney has a greater responsibility to re-
port wrongdoing does not necessarily equate with a model of
institutional loyalty for the Department of Justice.
The public interest model presents readily identifiable prob-
lems. Most glaringly, the model allows unelected officials to
substitute their judgment for that of an agency.2 Although
this model provides the individual attorney with the flexibility to
determine the fairness of each case, at the institutional level it
subordinates all agency policy choices to those of the Depart-
ment. The public interest model allows each attorney at the De-
partment to determine, what is in the public interest, thereby
replacing those reposed with decisionmaking authority in a
specific area. A law degree cannot change the nature of a civil
servant.
The public interest model also assumes that the Department
can separate legal issues from policy issues. While DOJ may
have more experience in determining the best legal course to
resolve conflicts,2" the decisions and reasoning behind litiga-
ing sanctions against a government attorney for failure to comply with court-ordered
discovery); EEOC v. Waterfront Comm'n, 665 F. Supp. 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (overturn-
ing sanctions against an EEOC attorney who inappropriately brought an action be-
fore the court). The impact of the Federal Rules of Professional Conduct on the
courts' interpretations of loyalty is unclear.
220. See Levanthal, supra note 195, at 5.
221. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
222. See Lanctot, supra note 4, at 1006.
223. See supra notes 127-34 and accompanying text.
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tion have policy implications. The vagueness of this model forces
a lawyer into a situation in which his loyalties are divided.224
Increasingly, law and policy are intertwined, and neat separa-
tions of the two are simplistic solutions to more complex issues.
Finally, no ethical standard specifically limits a government
attorney's duty to zealously represent a client. 5 In fact, the
Federal Model Rules make agency representation a higher prior-
ity than the public interest.2  The public interest model takes
a narrow view of the judgment of what is a good action. It does
not explain how an agency fails to pursue the public interest by
choosing to litigate a certain issue that it deems important. The
interests of the public and government are so vast and divergent
that DOJ may be overly presumptive to assume that litigation of
an issue that an agency deems important would waste govern-
ment resources. The Department of Justice is located within the
executive branch so that it can be accountable to the political
agendas that drive policy decisions.
When issues cross agency lines, DOJ properly should deter-
mine consistent government policy.22  For example, issues con-
cerning administrative procedure, civil procedure, the Freedom
of Information Act,228 or equal protection implicate the way
that government acts as a whole.229 Adverse precedents in
these areas hurt government entities other than just the litigat-
ing agency. The risks, therefore, demand DOJ involvement in
these areas. Officers like the solicitor general, for example, have
a mandate to look after the interests of all of government.
Although the public interest is not the proper object of DOJ
loyalty, the model has many useful attributes. Certainly, most
attorneys at DOJ believe that they are in government service to
advance the public good and the interests of the government.' 0
224. See Josephson & Pearce, supra note 156, at 564.
225. See Lanctot, supra note 4, at 1017 ("If government lawyers simply follow the
directions of the ethical codes, their resolution of these dilemmas will be the same
as that reached by private practitioners.").
226. See supra notes 182-86 and accompanying text.
227. Bell, supra note 18, at 1059.
228. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
229. Id.
230. Gardner Interview, supra note 140.
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This civil service is based on the concept that objective loyalty to
the government, not political loyalty to the executive, is para-
mount." Most attorneys at the Department of Justice are mo-
tivated by this objective loyalty. The public interest model pro-
vides a partial explanation for DOJ loyalty but fails to account
fully for why DOJ acts as it does, often not in conformity with
this model.
The Agency Model
Recognition that the agency is the client of the Department
repudiates the need for a separate public interest model." 2
Honoring the wishes of the agency in pursuit of legal policy is a
DOJ attorney's primary duty under this model. 3 The agency
model shifts loyalty from individual determinations of appropri-
ate action to the immediate lawyer-client relationship. Strict
adherence to this model casts Department attorneys as "hired
guns" with no discretion over litigation except for standard at-
torney advice.'
The ethical rules adopted the agency model because it provid-
es direct accountability of individual attorneys to the needs of
agencies. 5 Judge Griffin Bell emphasized the need to view the
agencies as clients in order to improve government action.26
The most powerful argument in support of the agency model,
however, is that the president or Congress has chosen the agen-
cy and its head to make decisions on agency issues and it is not
the prerogative of DOJ to question that authority by deviating
from the agency's desired litigation policy. 7 This argument
reinforces the hierarchical nature of political appointees who act
on a subject with presidential authority and congressional ap-
231. See Fahy, supra note 174, at 336 (discussing ethical considerations of promot-
ing public interest over private gain).
232. See Lanctot, supra note 4, at 958.
233. See Bell, supra note 101, at 793.
234. The Department is not a "super-agency ratifying or vetoing determinations
made by other departments or agencies." Griswold, supra note 39, at 528.
235. See supra notes 182-86 and accompanying text (detailing the ethical stan-
dards).
236. See Bell, supra note 18, at 1061-62.
237. See Griswold, supra note 39, at 528.
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proval. Executive policy control and congressional oversight
provide the sole checks on agency autonomy. Certainly, this
model appears to be the normal course of dealing for line attor-
neys at DOJ when dealing with their agency counterparts."5
Advocates for the agency-client model point to its analogy in
corporate representation. 9 An in-house counsel represents the
interest of the corporation as a whole but generally follows the
policy and direction of its officers and directors. An attorney only
varies from this progression of loyalty when she may have rea-
son to believe that the officer is not acting in the best interests
of the corporation."0 Objective, dispassionate legal advice is
important to both the corporate and government sectors, and
DOJ best provides such advice in the government sector."' As
Nelson Lund emphasized, "the analogy between the Attorney
General's opinion function and the advisory role of a private
lawyer seems to capture adequately the normative implications
of the doctrine of the unitary executive as it is reflected in our
law."" From an ethics perspective, this model harmonizes
standards for lawyers both in and out of public service. 3 Loy-
alty thus easily translates into zealous representation because
the only true concern of DOJ is the adequate representation of
agency needs.
The ease of this model's logic is also the source of its flaws.
The model can be viewed either as extremely naive or hopelessly
incomplete.' First, DOJ devotion to agency needs ignores a
world of limited legal and government resources. DOJ does not
238. Most DOJ attorneys believe that they do not have the authority to question
the litigation goals of an agency because these goals are political matters for the
agency head or general counsel to determine. Gardner Interview, supra note 140.
239. See Cramton, supra note 4, at 302; Lund, supra note 9, at 448.
240. E.g., Cramton, supra note 4, at 302.
241. See Lund, supra note 9, at 448 (asserting that, just as in-house counsel pro-
vide conservative advice in private practice, the OLC acts quasi-judicially because
objective advice is most beneficial to the client-the executive).
242. Id. at 451-52. Lund, however, does not believe that such an analogy is univer-
sal and points to criminal prosecutions as an example of differences in loyalties
between private and government attorneys. Telephone Interview with Nelson Lund,
Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law (Jan. 26, 1995).
243. See Lanctot, supra note 4, at 958.
244. See generally Barsdate, supra note 191 (providing a more detailed discussion of
attorney-client privilege when dealing with a government entity).
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have the capacity to litigate every matter that agencies want
litigated and must prioritize legal resources to focus on cer-
tain areas. Any decision to exclude a matter implicates policy.
Even if done with diplomatic cooperation between agencies,
some types of cases will be excluded more frequently than
will others, according to DOJ policy. The use of a central
body to sift out worthy government claims appears consistent
with the plain language of DOJ's statutory grant of authority
over litigation. 5
The tension created by DOJ's use of legal resource manage-
ment further underscores how the agency-as-client model is
incomplete. Agencies often express dissatisfaction with DOJ
representation. 6 This dissatisfaction fuels their determination
to lobby Congress for more independent litigating authority. 7
Donald Horowitz refutes the agency model concept by describing
this awkward situation as one of the "captive client." The agency
has no choice but to go along with DOJ decisions, making it an
involuntary client very unlike a client in the private sector, who
can choose from a competitive market."
The corporate analogy also fails under scrutiny. This analogy
gives credence to the public interest model by advocating that
lawyers are primarily bound to the institution and not the indi-
vidual for whom they work. 9 This approach opens the door to
the position that DOJ may determine what is in the
government's or public's best interests despite conflicting agency
wishes." If the private sector/corporate analogy applied only
to the DOJ-agency relationship, then there would be little need
for DOJ representation of agencies." With allegiance solely to
245. See supra note 1.
246. Gardner Interview, supra note 140; McGinnis Interview, supra note 136.
247. See generally Olson, supra note 11, at 80 (emphasizing that agency lawyers
have greater expertise in substantive agency matters than do DOJ lawyers).
248. See HORoWrrz, supra note 35, at 5-12, 37-44 (describing the division of legal
counseling and litigation functions between executive agencies and DOJ).
249. See Cramton, supra note 4, at 302.
250. Admittedly, the attorney usually takes independent action only when she sus-
pects fraud, corruption, or a conflict of interest among her superiors, whether they
be corporate officers or agency officials. See id.
251. See, e.g., Devins, supra note 21, at 325 (arguing that independent litigating
authority for independent agencies would not hurt the solicitor general); Olson, supra
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agencies, the Department would be nothing more than a holding
cell for agency lawyers. Congress might as well reformulate the
legal divisions to give agency counsel the bulk of the litigating
resources. This restructuring would enable attorneys to work
more closely with their clients and determine their needs. 2
Congress and the president repeatedly have decided to reject
this structure in favor of a more centralized method of con-
trol."' A complete decentralization of litigating authority
would eliminate any hope of maintaining a consistent govern-
ment litigating position on matters of broad effect.'
The basic fault with the agency-as-client model is that exclu-
sive agency loyalty may conflict with institutional loyalty to the
president. In the vast majority of cases, the Department views
the agency as possessing the authority to make executive policy
decisions and the ability to understand the nuances of a legal
field."5 The agency-as-client model, however, also ignores the
fundamental relationship between DOJ and the president; DOJ
is responsible for the government's consistent and coherent liti-
gation policy. On a practical level, this relationship means that,
in a case of conflict between agency policy and DOJ's interpreta-
tion of executive policy on the matter, DOJ has the authority to
modify, adapt, or ignore agency policy in litigation."5 The com-
pelling logic of this model provides a valuable norm of conduct
but fails to explain other influences on Department conduct.
note 11, at 83 (proposing that there is little use for DOJ involvement in 'routine"
litigation matters).
252. If the corporate analogy were true, it also could apply to the executive. DOJ
also could view the president as the true client/corporate head deserving loyalty be-
fore any agency.
253. Despite DOJ's broad grant of litigating authority, see 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1988),
Congress continues to make limited moves toward such a structure, recognizing that
the Department cannot adequately represent agency needs by granting independent
litigating authority, see supra notes 1842 and accompanying text.
254. See Bell, supra note 18, at 1059.
255. Gardner Interview, supra note 140.
256. This does not address the level at which DOJ may take such action. Modi-
fying, adopting, or ignoring agency policy is ordinarily a function of political appoint-
ees, not DOJ, unless such policy is inconsistent with overall government interests.




The idea that, "[w]ithin the Executive Branch, the government
attorney is emphatically a servant of the President" is perva-
sive.1 7 Claiming loyalty to the president as the ultimate client
of the Department is a more direct means of asserting authority
over agency litigation. Such an assertion is not only antagonistic
toward other agencies but also raises problems of executive
intent, interpretation, and control in a variety of contexts. Both
the agency model and the executive model can claim DOJ alle-
giance to the president as a rationale for their validity. The
question that they pose is: who best articulates executive poli-
cy- the agency entrusted with the subject matter or DOJ,
which is entrusted with representing the United States in court?
As with most issues in the administrative state, the answer is
unclear.
An agency model supports one theory of a unified executive.
When agencies and departments act in furtherance of executive
policy over congressional or independent decisionmaking, they
promote the position of a unitary executive. ' The presidential
powers of official appointment and control of the executive
branch and the president's role as chief law enforcer indicate
that an agency is responsible primarily to the president. 9 As
a result, agencies rationally argue that their choices in litigation
accurately reflect executive policy.2"
Nevertheless, just as each agency derives its mandate from
elected officials, DOJ derives its mandate from the presi-
dent.26 ' Because no one agency can understand litigation as
well as can DOJ, arguably, DOJ has a responsibility to fulfill
257. See, e.g., Bruce E. Fein, Promoting the President's Policies Through Legal Ad-
vocacy: An Ethical Imperative of the Government Attorney, 30 FED. B. NEWS & J.
406, 408 (1983).
258. For a comprehensive exploration of the policies behind the unitary executive,
see Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive: What Makes an Indepen-
dent Agency Independent?, 15 CARDoZO L. REv. 273 (1993); Devins, supra note 21.
259. See generally Geoffrey Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41
(analyzing the specific powers of agencies).
260. See sources cited supra note 20 and accompanying text.
261. See Bell, supra note 101, at 791.
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presidential policy in litigation.262 Once in the realm of litiga-
tion, DOJ can appropriately control the destiny of an issue.2"
Centralized control of litigation is a tool that the president
can use to establish a unitary executive." In varying degrees,
a president with an aggressive attorney general can control bu-
reaucratic action and steer policy through government litigation,
filtering out unworthy cases for the lower courts just as the
solicitor general does for the Supreme Court.2" Through its
close political role, DOJ can serve the president as a watchdog
against legislation and regulation that would dilute executive
policies or power.266 DOJ can assert that it reflects true execu-
tive policy better than do agencies because of its position within
the executive branch.
For several reasons, the Department is an easy vehicle
through which executive policy may be implemented. First, com-
pared with agencies, few interest groups affect nominations and
alliances within DOJ.267 Appointments and attitudes within
DOJ are consequently more closely aligned with the president's
positions.268 Second, the attorney general's long history of be-
ing a revered cabinet member encourages the appointment of a
close presidential ally and a politically homogeneous group with-
in the Department.269 Third, DOJ attorneys depend on the
262. Olson, supra note 11, at 78, 79.
263. See Responsibilities of Client Agencies, in 3 DEP'T OF JUSTICE MANUAL, supra
note 24, at 4-17 ("Authority over the disposition of a civil matter, once it is referred
to the Department of Justice, resides in the Attorney General or his/her delegate,
and the client agency may not control its handling or disposition.") (citing ETC v.
Guignon, 390 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1968); United States v. Sandstrom, 22 F. Supp.
190, 191 (N.D. Okla. 1938)).
264. See HOROWITZ, supra note 35, at 107 (stating that "[clentralized litigating
authority is one of the few ready handles on the bureaucracy that a President pos-
sesses").
265. Id. For an explanation of the solicitor general's gatekeeping function, see
SALOKAR, supra note 38, at 173. But see Bell, supra note 18, at 1061 (detailing how
the filtering process should occur throughout DOJ but is roadblocked by agency inde-
pendent litigating authority).
266. Kmiec, supra note 9, at 341.
267. See generally HOROWITZ, supra note 35, at 133 (expressing concern that agency
attorneys may be more beholden to special interests than are DOJ attorneys).
268. McGinnis Interview, supra note 136.
269. Harold R. Tyler, Jr., The Attorney General of the United States-Counsel to the
President or to the Government?, 45 ALB. L. REV. 1, 7 (1980) (stating that the presi-
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Department's hierarchy, not their agency clients, to determine
policy"' Department dynamics make it easier to disseminate,
understand, and implement executive policy that flows down-
ward through a direct chain of command."' Fourth, because
DOJ often litigates on matters that affect the government as a
whole,272 it is more in tune with executive policy in litigation.
Because such a close relationship exists between an agency
lawyer and the subject matter of the litigation, an agency lawyer
becomes more tied to the subject than to the executive's will. 273
A DOJ lawyer, in contrast, is forced to become a generalist who
supports broader executive policy. 4
Support for the executive model is readily found in the statu-
tory grants and executive orders that establish the Department's
supremacy in litigation.27 The OLC promotes DOJ supremacy
by the scope of agency litigation powers. 6 Ted Olson, head of
dent appoints an attorney general "most likely to hold views consistent with those
forming the basis for the President's election"). The appointments of Edward Meese,
John Mitchell, and Robert Kennedy are such examples. Recent presidents, however,
have appointed politically removed attorneys general such as Edward Levi, Griffin
Bell, and Janet Reno. See generally Diana R. Gordon, Cleaning Up the Mess at Jus-
tice, NATION, Apr. 19, 1993, at 505 (stating that many attorneys general, such as
Mitchell and Kennedy, have been their presidents' campaign managers but that
there have also been independent-minded people in the job, such as Levi).
270. FRIED, supra note 39, at 189.
271. See id. (stating that "loyalty makes for dependability").
272. See HOROWITZ, supra note 35, at 65-66.
273. See id at 35 (describing agency lawyers as being more specialized than gov-
ernment lawyers in agency programs because of longer tenure and lower turnover).
274. See id.
275, See 5 U.S.C. § 3106 (1988) (providing that "the head of an Executive . . . or
military department may not employ an attorney... for the conduct of litigation in
which the United States ... is a party... but shall refer the matter to the De-
partment of Justice"); 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1988) (providing that, "[e]xcept as otherwise
authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in which the United States . . . is a par-
ty ... is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice"); Exec. Order No. 6166
(1933) (consolidating, reorganizing, transferring, and abolishing certain executive
agencies); Exec. Order No. 2877 (1918) (placing all government law officers under
the Justice Department).
276. Congress must be specific to limit DOJ's litigating authority. E.g., 16 Op. Off.
Legal Counsel 67, 67 (1992) (stating that the Veterans Administration cannot use a
"master amici" to assist veterans in claims against the United States); 13 Op. Off.
Legal Counsel 350, 350 (1989) (stating that the Federal Trade Commission cannot
litigate criminal contempt actions); 12 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 135, 135 (1988)
(stating that the Interstate Commerce Commission lacks specific power to intervene);
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the OLC during part of the Reagan Administration, developed
arguments that advance the theory of a unified executive
through statutory construction and executive intent."' To
Olson, the president is clearly the client of the Department.278
All litigating control is centralized, except when explicitly grant-
ed to agencies, and the expansion of litigating authority should
be uniformly rejected." 9 In his opinions, Olson attempted to
solidify DOJ control over interagency disputes despite ambigu-
ous congressional grants of agency control of litigation.' Both
Olson and his predecessor, John Harmon, used OLC opinions to
limit the scope of MOUs by promoting the Department's role
within a unitary executive model.28'
Political accountability of the Department through the attor-
ney general is inherent in the unified executive model.282 Bruce
Fein, former General Counsel of the Federal Communications
Commission, advocated a unitary model when he said: "The
President is entitled, however, to the best legal advocacy of gov-
ernment attorneys devoted to shaping the evolution of legal
doctrines that will sustain the President's programs and policy
objectives. Otherwise, the President's constitutional powers will
be blunted, and the will of the electorate thwarted."2" When
4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 820, 820 (1980) (stating that DOJ may not enter into a
MOU transferring litigating authority to the Office of Federal Inspector); 3 Op. Off.
Legal Counsel 104, 105 (1979) (stating that the Eagleton-Biden Amendments do not
limit the use of Department of Health, Education and Welfare funds to support a
lawsuit brought by DOJ).
277. E.g., The Attorney General's Role As Chief Litigator for the United States, 6
Op. Off. Legal Counsel 47, 48 (1982) (stating that, absent clear legislative directives
to the contrary, the attorney general has full authority over all litigation).
278. Id. at 54 ("[T]he Attorney General alone is obligated to represent the broader
interests of the Executive."); id. at 481, 483 (stating that the president is the client
of the attorney general for purposes of a confidentiary and advisory relationship).
279. E.g., 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 820 (1980) (stating that MOUs must contain
explicit language divesting DOJ of litigating authority).
280. See sources cited supra note 275.
281. 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 47 (1982) (holding that the sharing of litigation au-
thority is only permissible when the attorney general retains ultimate authority over
litigation); 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 820 (1980) (limiting the use of MOUs to agree-
ments between DOJ and those agencies that already possess some litigating authori-
ty).




DOJ does not account for presidential policy, it can harm its own
institutional power by losing executive respect.2" Presidential
control over DOJ arguably is more important than presidential
control over any other agency because DOJ goes to the core of
the president's duty to faithfully execute and enforce the
laws.' The president "must have the ability to closely oversee
such activity, in order that he may understand the difficulties of
enforcement and the possible ramifications of those difficulties
for his own national policies.""5
Following executive will may take two forms. First, one con-
stantly can address situations by interpreting and following the
president's policy. Bruce Fein advocated this approach, calling
for government attorneys to be continually vigilant. 87 Ground-
ing his argument in the right to self-government, Fein stated
that "the government attorney must both understand and ad-
here to the ethical imperative of promoting the President's poli-
cies to avoid constitutional malfunctioning."2" While commend-
ably attempting to further uniformity, lawyer interpretations at
different levels may in fact lead to inconsistent translations of
executive will or to a host of unthinking presidential instru-
ments acting by second-guessing another.289
A second view of loyalty focuses on individual judgment and
applies most readily to political appointees. Second-guessing
presidential action is unnecessary because the political hierarchy
will account for any disloyal acts.Y Charles Fried, solicitor
general under President Reagan, asserted this view, stating that
"loyalty [is] essentially an interpretive virtue according to which
the officer uses his own judgment and values to make the best
and most coherent whole out of his administration's projects and
tendencies"29' and that "I had been appointed to exercise my
284. Kmiec, supra note 9, at 353-59 (arguing that, when useful, OLC should act as
a stronger advocate for presidential policies in its opinions).
285. Tyler, supra note 269, at 8.
286. Id.
287. Fein, supra note 257, at 408.
288. Id.
289. FRIED, supra note 39, at 188-90.
290. See generally id. at 173-205 (describing the nature of loyalty owed tb the pres-
ident by a high government official).
291. Id. at 173.
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judgment, rather than to try to guess what Ronald Reagan
would have said about some particular technical matter."292
The principles for which the president was elected are the prin-
ciples on which the subordinates should base their actions.9
The executive model suffers from the same flaw that plagues
the public interest model. Under the theory of constant inter-
pretation, DOJ suffers from a lack of objectivity in its ac-
tions. 4 This lack of neutrality harms the Department's repu-
tation within the government.9 5  Imposing executive will
through representation, however, is a foundation of much of our
government. Nevertheless, when it is the only force acting on
decisions, confrontation and conflict in a public manner is
bound to occur. Resignation or dismissal then becomes the re-
course for noncompliance. 6
The problems with the executive model, as with the previous
models, are often a matter of degree. Interpreting executive
policy creates a new set of problems and choices, but it is, sim-
ply, the cost of public service. Assertions that DOJ more closely
reflects executive will in litigation support a theory that the
corporate analogy of the agency model is more appropriate than
is the executive model. 97 Unchecked use of discretion, howev-
er, is much akin to the public interest model's arrogance in poli-
cymaking. This model appears to describe DOJ action at the
political level but is incomplete in its analysis of the total scope
of agency representation.
292. Id. at 191.
293. See id. at 189-90.
294. See Schnapper, supra note 41, at 1196-210 (discussing how the solicitor gener-
al must maintain an image of relative neutrality before the Supreme Court).
295. See Jospeh R. Biden, Jr., Balancing Law and Politics: Senate Oversight of the
Attorney General Office, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 151, 157 (1990) ("[W]hen the Attor-
ney General loses his balance and begins to serve only his political masters ....
the Congress has an obligation to step in and attempt to restore the balance ....
[W]e are duty-bound to act.").
296. Fried suffered the results of his theory, as he resigned once his actions be-
came too inconsistent with executive policy. Fred Strasser, Justice Department Now
Taking Shape, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 5, 1988, at 2; see FRIED, supra note 39, at 193 (stat-
ing that "[tlo put oneself at odds with one's superior and then continue to act in his
name suggests an entitlement to office which no unelected person has").




The behavioral and normative models for DOJ loyalty reflect
its history, ethical responsibilities, and surrounding political
forces. DOJ continually balances these different loyalties to
preserve its own power, implement executive policy, and justly
represent agency needs. Models that focus only on one potential
motivation for DOJ action misinterpret the complexity of DOJ
roles and interests in agency litigation.
History demonstrates a constant swing between centralized
litigation functions at DOJ and decentralization among the
many agencies.29 Possibly searching for efficient regulatory
enforcement or concerned with executive influence, Congress has
repeatedly limited DOJ power by decentralizing litigating au-
thority. Repeated attempts to reconsolidate this power keep
DOJ's intergovernmental power in balance. As a result, history
as a precedent for DOJ loyalty provides a paradigm for every
view.
Centralization of litigating authority allows DOJ to develop a
uniform government legal policy on broad issues that arguably
best serves government and its citizens.' Its dispassionate
expertise in litigating often provides a respected voice for gov-
ernment in contrast to the approach of agency lawyers, who may
be beholden to the policies and interests of a specific agency.30 0
The Department's desire to centralize litigating authority, how-
ever, brings with it an obligation to represent agency needs
fairly."' In a world with limited budgets, this creates the con-
flict of having to limit agency representation through policy
choices.
A bureaucratic model of agency representation contends that
DOJ lawyers always act with the interest of maximizing DOJ
power.0 2 This presumably occurs through supporting executive
298. See supra notes 43-123 and accompanying text.
299. See HoROWrrZ, supra note 35, at 1-9 (discussing the different functions of DOJ
and agencies with respect to litigation and counseling).
300. Id. at 133.
301. Id. at 39. The Department rarely refuses to defend agency practices: "It is
rather well established that every agency is entitled to be defended." Id.
302. See supra notes 124-52 and accompanying text.
1996] 1613
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1569
policy when necessary but remaining neutral and supportive of
agency needs to preserve reputational capital with Congress. In-
stitutional security and position is a great underlying motiva-
tional factor in government today."'
The bureaucratic model accounts for the various interagen-
cy relationships under one theory but most likely oversimpli-
fies individual motivations. Self-promotion through DOJ
decisionmaking assumes that a well-planned strategy permeates
such a large and diverse organization. Undoubtedly, DOJ law-
yers often make litigation decisions with no concern as to insti-
tutional reputation."4 The bureaucratic model's post hoc expla-
nation of loyalty provides little guidance as to which loyalty best
serves government litigation.
Many theorists advance the idea that an agency must always
remain the client of DOJ when it chooses to litigate a matter.
When DOJ cannot fulfill its duty adequately, independent liti-
gating authority is appropriate.0 5 Agencies see their own coun-
sel as more responsive to their needs because of their counsels'
continued familiarity with the issues.0 ' Agencies prefer a sys-
tem allowing litigation of their own issues, whereas the Depart-
ment handles broader government-wide issues.0 7
The agency-client model is useful in describing most DOJ-
agency litigation relationships. 8' Unfortunately, when conflict
between an agency and DOJ arises, the agency model rigidly
sees only the agency view as determinative. This model fails to
recognize that DOJ may have a more holistic view of the govern-
mental effect of litigating a matter. Parochial agency concerns
may contradict executive policy or set a bad precedent for other
matters. Periodic presidential attempts to consolidate litigation
authority evidence a concern that DOJ most effectively repre-
303. See STRINE, supra note 30, at 24-33 (examining closely the institutional roles
and positions within a bureaucracy).
304. Gardner Interview, supra note 140.
305. See HOROWlTZ, supra note 35, at 107. Independent litigating authority becomes
a symptom or result of the larger problem-DOJ cannot be loyal to agency interests.
Id. at 107-16.
306. See Olson, supra note 11, at 80.
307. See id. at 83.




The public interest model balances DOJ's ability to determine
the duty and ethics of a public servant with the pledge to uphold
the Constitution and obey duly appointed government offi-
cers."0 9 This idealistic model embodies the general sentiment
that a public servant should do good whenever possible. This
duty to serve the public interest is important when another
government agent suggests illegal or unethical activity. Unfortu-
nately, however, this model fails to support client relationships
that do not involve wrongdoing. Ethical standards specifically
reject this model as being too ambiguous.31° The possibility of
having hundreds of individual determinations of the public in-
terest would defeat DOJ's purpose of creating a uniform govern-
ment litigating policy.
The executive model recognizes the president as the true cli-
ent of DOJ. Because of the attorney general's historically
close relationship with the president, DOJ often can implement
executive policy more effectively than can the agencies. DOJ
strips agencies of their parochial interests by making litigation
choices with only the executive's will in mind. Implementing
executive will can be done through constant interpretation or by
representation stemming from presidential appointment."'
Like the public interest model, the executive model leaves
open the possibility of multiple interpretations of the client's
will. Excessive executive loyalty blinds DOJ from varied inter-
ests within government. DOJ's resulting lack of objectivity re-
duces its own reputational value with other agencies, Congress,
and the courts.
The validity of each model under different circumstances
shows that no one model completely describes Department loyal-
309. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. Most government officials are required to pledge
their oath to support and defend the Constitution, not the president. This, however,
does not diminish the dilemma of how and when they should defy superiors or agen-
cies. See Schnapper, supra note 162, at 654 (stating that, when the law is in conflict
with the policies of a client, the government attorney must still inform the client of
the law, regardless of whether the individual at odds with the law is a public offi-
cial).
310. See supra notes 153-86 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 257-97 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 287-93 and accompanying text.
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ty. Each model addresses loyalty according to the relationships
between the parties and the parties' respective roles. The varied
facts and forces that operate in each case of representation make
a single model inappropriate for describing the loyalty relation-
ship. Loyalties may change according to the Department's capac-
ity as adviser or litigator, the interests represented, the nature
of the conflict, and the political level of the actors involved.
These models, therefore, describe only valid factors used in the
Department's decisionmaking when pursuing agency litigation.
This Note provides a framework, comprised of several differ-
ent theories for determining DOJ's loyalty when representing
agencies in litigation. This comprehensive collection of loyalty
models consolidates the various legal concepts into a single dis-
cussion. Hopefully, statistical-based analysis can incorporate
this information into a more analytically sophisticated discus-
sion of DOJ action.31
James R. Harvey III
313. Updating Donald Horowitz's analysis in THE JUROCRACY, supra note 35, which
relies heavily on statistical data, would facilitate a more complete understanding of
these theories' impact.
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